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 ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the main causes of the present political crisis in Zimbabwe with 
particular reference to the crisis as a direct result of a crisis of authority or governance. 
The economy and the political environments in the former Rhodesia have been in a 
healthy state until the early 1990s when the ruling ZANU-PF had its rule under siege 
when the economy dwindled and the opposition became rife.  
 
The broad questions that the study sought to answer were: What have been the primary 
reasons for the political crisis in Zimbabwe between 1995 and 2005? What role has the 
political elite played in the country’s development? What contribution did the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme make to the economic development of Zimbabwe? 
Are there any other important factors that have played a role in the development process 
of Zimbabwe? 
 
As a way of investigation, this study uses qualitative research techniques to make a 
clinical examination of the main causes of the political crisis that has reduced the 
formerly self-sustaining and democratically highly rated country to a pariah citizen (state) 
of the world. A number of primary sources have been used and have had their 
responses/input supplemented by relatively reliable secondary sources that gave 
authenticity to the argument of the research.  
 
VIII 
This study makes a ten year review of the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe, 
as this is the period whence the political crisis became apparent and restricts its 
investigation of the causes of the political crisis to this period albeit some of these 
reasons are connected to the past i.e. the period from 1980 to 1995. Since this is a 
deductive scholarly account, the study tests the theory of organic crisis as an explanation 
for state collapse in Africa with particular reference to Zimbabwe. 
 
Finally the study reveals that the major causes of the political crisis in Zimbabwe are the 
colonial legacy which seems to have had its negative on the politics of the country just ten 
years into democracy; the crisis of governance which led to political and economic decay as 
the ruling party tried by all means to solicit political support; the Lancaster House agreement 
and the land question which are related to the question of colonial legacy and among the 
primary reasons Zimbabwe has reached political impasse; the crisis of elites which this 
directly links to the political crisis; structural adjustment programmes and corruption and 
fraud. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY. 
From the early days of slavery to the recent times of liberal democracy, the African 
state has always been on the fringes of economic, political and social transformation. 
It is not arguable that the African continent has been riddled with inter-state war, 
ethnic war, civil war, famine, disease and other inhuman situations. Zimbabwe, part 
of the most impoverished region in Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, has not survived the 
curse of the “unreliable” African leadership and “shaky” African governance 
phenomena.  
 
It was in 1961 that a constitution that was in favour of white minority rule was 
formulated without the consultation or the approval of the black majority of the 
country. In 1965 the minority government unilaterally declared Rhodesian 
independence, but the UK did not recognise the act and demanded more complete 
voting rights for the black African majority in Rhodesia as the country was then 
referred to (CIA, 2005).  
 
UN sanctions and a guerrilla uprising finally led to free elections in 1979 and 
independence (as Zimbabwe) on 18 April 1980. Robert Mugabe, who in 1980 became 
the nation's first black prime minister, has been the country's only ruler (as president 
since 1987) and has dominated the country's political system since independence 
(CIA, 2005). The elections in 1980 were as a result of the Lancaster House conference that 
was attended by all the warring parties in the country’s power politics. It was at the same 
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conference that a new constitution for the new Republic of Zimbabwe was adopted 
(Sithole, 1990:458). 
 
Besides the crisis of political leadership, which could be the main reason for the 
collapse of the state in Zimbabwe, the beginning of the economic problems of the 
country may be traced to the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) by the International Financial Institutions who, following an ideology known 
as neoliberalism, imposed these on African governments thus making these countries 
heavily indebted to them (Shah, 2005).  
 
In spite of Zimbabwe’s adherence to the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme, which was supposed to drastically deregulate the economy as well as 
lend money (and indebt) to an economy that seemed, according to the IMF and the 
World Bank, overprotected and inefficient, all the programme’s targets were missed 
by huge margins (Bond, 2000).  
 
The political turmoil in Zimbabwe began in the late 1990s when the educated and 
urban residents became unhappy with little or non-performance of the Zimbabwe 
African National Union-Patriotic Front government. This did not come as a 
democratic expression in the eyes of the “sole” ruler of the country, Robert Mugabe. 
He could not take criticism hence he embarked on tactics such as farm evictions, 
urban dweller evictions (Operation Muranbatsvina), alleged vote rigging as well as 
state media monopoly, denigrating the opposition that emerged from a disgruntled 
and discontented labour movement. 
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The Human Rights Watch organisation was particularly critical and had this to say: 
“Zimbabwe is in the midst of a profound political and economic crisis. Parliamentary 
elections held in 2000 and presidential elections in 2002 were marred by political 
disturbances and violence between the opposition Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) and the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). 
The government has routinely used repressive legislation and other violent means to 
suppress criticism of its political and economic policies by civil society activists and 
the opposition” (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
 
Making things even worse for the already struggling country was its expulsion from 
the Commonwealth. The decision to expel the country from the organisation was 
taken in 2002 after the organisation’s observer group, the Commonwealth Observer 
Group, reported that the 2002 presidential elections were not free and fair as they, 
“were marred by a high level of politically motivated violence and intimidation. Even 
after this incident, Mugabe never gave up but instead lambasted the organisation as 
one under the control of white “racists” (Human Rights First, 2003). 
 
As a result of the human rights violations in Zimbabwe, the European Union foreign 
ministers took a decision at their meeting in Brussels to impose sanctions on the 
country’s ruling elite as well as pull its election observers out of the country. In 
addition, the UK foreign secretary Jack Straw said that these sanctions would include 
a ban on travel to the EU, a freeze on financial assets held in the EU and an arms 
embargo (BBC News, 2002).  
 
 4 
The chaotic land redistribution campaign which began in earnest in 2000 caused an 
exodus of white farmers, crippled the economy, and ushered in widespread shortages 
of basic commodities with which people would easily survive. Ignoring international 
condemnation, Mugabe allegedly rigged the 2002 presidential election to ensure his 
re-election to power (CIA, 2005). 
 
Further isolating Zimbabwe from the global financial system was the IMF’s decision 
after review of the country’s overdue financial obligations to the organisation, to 
declare the country ineligible to use general resources of the organisation and further 
removing the country from the list of countries eligible to borrow resources under the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRDF) (IMF, 2001). As a result of this 
review and declaration the IMF advised the country to adopt and implement a 
comprehensive economic recovery programme in return for the cooperation of the 
fund (IMF, 2001).  
 
Out of frustration and the need for benevolent counterparts, Mugabe adopted a “Look 
East” policy as his Western counterparts had ostracised him for the human rights 
violations in his country. His first port of call in the east was China. The two countries 
signed an agreement worth US$4.5 million that was meant to assist Zimbabwe in 
developmental programmes in the economic and technical areas (People’s Daily 
Online, 2003). 
 
Amidst criticism and driven by the will to monopolise the media, the parliament of 
Zimbabwe passed a stringent new media bill, called the Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Bill (All Africa.com, 2002).  
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1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The objective of this study is to investigate the causes of the political crisis in 
Zimbabwe. Although Zimbabwe has been a breadbasket of the Southern African 
region for a good number of years, it is interesting to ascertain why the country finds 
itself in a trap of political and economic crisis that has led to it being counted among 
the poorest countries of the Sub-Saharan region. Consequently, the study seeks to 
shed light on the the impact of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme that 
was adopted in the early 1990s, as well as other significant factors such as the land 
question that the political crisis might be directly or indirectly a consequence of. 
 
Political, economic, environmental and social issues will be analysed, thus leading the 
researcher to making recommendations that could serve as a solution to the prevailing 
crisis in the country.  As part of providing a solution to the problem, the following 
section provides the research questions. 
 
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The following research questions will guide the study:  
• What have been the primary reasons for the political crisis in Zimbabwe 
between 1995 and 2005? 
• What role has the political elite played in the country’s development? 
• What contribution did the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) make to the economic development of Zimbabwe? 
• Are there any other important factors that have played a role in the 
development process of Zimbabwe? 
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1.4. RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
 
This study stems from the necessity to contribute to the scholarly debate on the causes of 
state collapse in Africa and further suggest solutions to this phenomenon. This study seeks 
to revive the apparently dwindling scholarly discourse on state collapse in Africa with 
scholars focusing on the positive developments on the continent e.g. economic 
development under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, conflict resolution, etc. 
Specifically this study seeks to investigate the causes of the political crisis in Zimbabwe 
with special reference to the period between 1995 and 2005. In the post-colonial era, there 
has been debate about leaders of liberation movements not wanting to relinquish power 
after years at the political helm. Some writers have come up with very interesting theories 
in trying to analyse this phenomenon. The theory of state collapse and the crisis of 
orthodoxy are some of the theories that have been used to explain the above. It appears 
useful to explore the relationship between the crisis of leadership within the political elites 
and the failure of the state in general, that is, the collapse of the state. In exposing the 
relationship between the crisis of elites and the collapse of the state specifically in 
Zimbabwe, the study posits an early warning to other countries that are on the verge of 
collapsing as a result of the crisis of leadership. Furthermore, the study seeks to advance 
knowledge on the causes of conflict and conflict resolution strategies in Africa.  
 
1.5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The crisis in Zimbabwe seems to have started as a result of the crisis in the political 
leadership of the country, which became even more apparent in the period that this 
study seeks to focus on i.e. the period between 1995 and 2005. In pondering the 
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causes of the political crisis in Zimbabwe, this study makes use of the theoretical 
category of organic crisis, as espoused by the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci. 
 
Antonio Gramsci, as explained in Jones (2006)  an Italian political theorist, reveals 
that the crisis of authority or the   crisis of the state looms when the ruling class loses 
the consent of the masses, or when there is a mobilization of large subordinate classes 
against the ruling class. When the detachment of the masses from the ruling classes 
takes place anything is possible and violent solutions are likely to be proposed. It is at 
this point that the ruling class uses violence and other coercive measures to maintain 
its control of the state thus quelling opposition. 
 
The theory of organic crisis is articulated in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks: 
At a certain point in their historical lives, social classes become 
detached from their traditional parties. In other words, the 
traditional parties in that particular organisational form, with 
the particular men who constitute, represent and lead them, are 
no longer recognised by their class (or fraction of a class) as its 
expression. When such crises occur, the immediate situation 
becomes delicate and congerous, because the field is open for 
violent solutions, for the activities of unknown forces, 
represented by charismatic "men of destiny"(Hoare & Smith, 
1971: 189). 
 
Reuben Mogano further explains this theory:  
 An organic crisis refers to a situation where the dominant hegemony 
is disintegrating and the masses' ties to the dominant and traditional 
ideologies are broken. In other words "organic crisis" is basically a 
crisis of authority (Mogano, 1993:4). 
 
The theory of state collapse is the other theory that has been used to give theoretical 
guidance to the researcher in attempting to explain the political crisis in Zimbabwe. In 
trying to explain the theory, Thurchin quotes Goldstone (1991): 
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The core of the theory of state collapse, as it is currently 
formulated concerns the relationship between population 
growth and fiscal stability of the state. Briefly, population 
growth in excess of the productivity gains from the land leads 
to persistent inflation and rising real costs, which outstrip the 
ability of the state to increase tax revenues. Rapid expansion 
of population also results in an increased number of aspirants 
for elite positions, putting further fiscal strains on the state, 
and intensifying intra-elite competition and factionalism. 
Increased rural misery, urban migration, and falling real 
wages lead to frequent food riots and wage protests; 
expansion of youth cohorts contributes to the population 
mobilization potential; and elite competition and popular 
discontent fuel ideological conflicts. As all these trends 
intensify, the end result is state bankruptcy and consequent 
loss of military control; elite movements of regional and 
national rebellion; and a combination of elite-mobilized and 
popular uprisings that manifest the breakdown of central 
authority (Thurchin, 2003: 25). 
 
 
Empirical and documentary evidence has been given to give flesh to the theory in 
relation to the political situation in Zimbabwe. 
 
1.6. OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY. 
 
As a qualitative case study, this study mainly makes use of interviews and textual 
analyses. Semi-structured interviews were used as they allow for flexibility in terms 
of the order of asking and the answering of questions. E-interviews were also used for 
respondents that cannot be reached by telephone face to face. Textual analysis 
included: books, journal articles, newspaper articles, electronic documents, 
monographs, government reports and other local international agencies’ reports. 
Those interviewed include, economists and political analysts or experts.  
 
The findings of this study have been interpreted and analysed. After making thorough 
analysis of the data collected, the researcher was  then in a better position to make 
generalisations. Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee (2006:163) put it clearly that, “the data 
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analysis process allows the researcher to generalise the findings from the sample used in 
the research, to the larger population in which the researcher is interested”.  
 
1.7. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
 
1.7.1. Structural Adjustment Programme  
“Structural Adjustment Policies are economic policies which countries must follow in 
order to qualify for new World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans 
and help them make debt repayments on the older debts owed to commercial banks, 
governments and the World Bank. Although SAPs are designed for individual 
countries but have common guiding principles and features which include export-led 
growth; privatisation and liberalisation; and the efficiency of the free market” (The 
Whirled Bank Group, S.a.) 
1.7.2. State  
A political association that establishes sovereign jurisdiction within defined territorial 
borders, characterised by its monopoly of legitimate violence (Heywood, 1997:413). 
1.7.3. Lancaster House Constitution/Agreement  
“This was the independence agreement for Rhodesia now known as Zimbabwe. It was 
signed on 21 December 1979. The agreement ended the white rule in Rhodesia under 
Ian Smith; it was signed between the Patriotic Front (PF), consisting of ZAPU 
(Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) 
and the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government, represented at that time by Bishop Abel 
Muzorewa and Smith” (Wikipedia, 2006). 
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1.7.4. Operation Muranbatsvina  
 A Shona term meaning ‘clear the filth’ (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
 
1.8. DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The study is delimitated to Zimbabwe and studies a ten-year period (1995 – 2005) of 
the evolution of politics of the country. The study is delimitated to an analysis of the 
causes of the political turmoil in Zimbabwe. For this purpose it examines the political, 
economic and social aspects of the crisis in question. 
 
1.9. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
This study is composed of five chapters. Chapter 2 provides a review of existing 
literature, both theoretical and empirical; Chapter 3 comprises the research design 
that has been utilised to collect data and analyse it; Chapter 4 presents the findings of 
the study as well as the discussion and analysis of the data collected. Lastly, the 
summary, conclusions and recommendations of the study are presented in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of the African state system from the 
formation and collapse of the state in general to the specifics of the political crisis in 
Zimbabwe. The chapter further presents a review of relevant literature that will assist 
the researcher in trying to ponder the main causes of the political crisis in the country.  
It is worth noting that this is the same Zimbabwe that in 1980, after the demise of minority 
rule, had the second most advanced economy in Africa that is today on the front pages as 
one of the worst economies in the world. Good (1997:148) asserts that the economy has 
been brought down by Robert Mugabe, who is obsessed with power to such an extent that 
he is prepared to hold on to it at all costs. Good (1997:146) goes on to say, “When an 
organised democratic movement developed in the late 1990s, steadily increasing its 
popular support, he (Mugabe) started to harass its members and meetings, tortured and 
killed its supporters, and ensured through various stratagems that it was denied electoral 
victory in March 2002”. 
 
2.2. THE COLONIAL LEGACY 
Evidence is abound that the state in Africa did not come into being only after the 
introduction of the western institution as we are today made to believe. If it claimed 
that the Africa state began when the Europeans colonised Africa, then the logical 
question that follows would be, “If there were no states in Africa then what would 
have been there?” 
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Ojo (2004) asserts that the pre-colonial state predates the birth of the nation as defined 
by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Shraeder (2000:62) cited in Ojo (2004) states that 
this treaty marked the beginning of the nation state system in which sovereign 
political entities, independent of any outside authorities exercised control over people 
in separate territories with officially marked boundaries. The pre-colonial African 
states of Axiom (100-700AD), Kush (800BC-350OAD), Ghana (Old Ghana Empire 
(700-1200AD), Mali (1200-1500AD) the Songhai (1350-1600AD), Benin (1500-
1800AD) , Oyo Empire (1600-1850 AD), Buganda (1600-1900AD) and Kanen Borno 
(800-1900AD) all demonstrated some of  these characteristics. The re-organisation of 
African boundaries during the European scramble for the continent does not render 
inconsequential what then states were (Ojo, 2004). 
 
Before the country became Rhodesia (after Cecil John Rhodes) it was ruled by King 
Lobengula. King Lobengula was tricked by the representatives of Cecil Rhodes’ British 
South Africa Company (BSAC) into handing over control of the land and the people of 
Zimbabwe. When the trick was realized, the people fiercely defended their land from the 
colonialists, but by the end of the 19th century, resistance to colonization had been crushed 
with the help of British troops from South Africa. The BSAC ruled Rhodesia for thirty 
years encouraging white settlement and reducing the Africans to dispossessed cheap 
labour. In 1923, the British government granted internal self- government to the white 
settlers, but Africans had no democratic rights (Ndlovu, 1980:1) 
 
Similar to the majority of African countries, Zimbabwe was also under the unbearable 
yoke of colonialism, which undermined majority rule and institutionalised minority 
rule by the colonialists. The country has also been entangled in the brutal fight by the 
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majority against the ruling minority to have the wealth shared and political and human 
rights enjoyed by all who live in the country. This has been the trend in colonial 
Africa.  
 
Before the end of selective and minority rule, Zimbabwe was known as Rhodesia after 
Cecil John Rhodes, the commander of the British South African Company. Cecil John 
Rhodes, in the late 1800s led the British South Africa Company south of South Africa 
in search of rumoured mineral wealth in the Southern country (Olaleye, 2005:5).  
In 1953, the British government joined Southern Rhodesia with Northern Rhodesia 
(Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) in what was described as the Central African 
Federation. The African people in these three territories joined together in opposing the 
amalgamation. In 1959 the popular resistance by the African political movements led to 
the arrest of African political leaders (Olaleye, 2005:5). 
 
In 1963, this resistance led the British government to agree to break up the federation. This 
decision led to a second yoke of political domination of the African people in Zimbabwe, 
when the white minority in Zimbabwe objected to the new political arrangement and voted 
into power the Rhodesia Front (RF) under the leadership of Ian Smith. The RF defended 
white supremacy and demanded full independence from Britain and the retention of 
minority-rule against the African uprising (Olaleye, 2005:5). 
 
In order to prevent Zimbabwe from “going Communist” the British government in cahoots 
with the Americans, in particular Henry Kissinger had sought a settlement to the 
Rhodesian Question. This was not possible as the constitutional proposal put forward by 
the two governments were not acceptable to the liberation movement. In trying to create an 
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illusionary multiracial country, Ian Smith solicited the political support of some chiefs and 
certain African leaders such as Reverend Sithole and Reverend Muzorewa for an internal 
settlement. However, the Reverends could not stop the guerrilla war (Ndlovu, 1980:3). 
 
With the signing of “Rudd’s’ concessions” King Lobengula gave his land and people to 
the British. The abovementioned concession tricked the king into surrendering the land 
and mineral right of the country in exchange for 1000 rifles, 100,000 rounds of 
ammunition (100 a month and a gun boat. The last items- hardly much used in landlocked 
Zimbabwe were never delivered (Ndlovu, 1980:5).  
 
2.3. THE IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE 
 
Herbst (1990:31) says that the new regimes’ incomplete control of the state was worsened 
by its failure to develop a comprehensive ideology. Citing Munston (1985) Herbst points 
the weaknesses of the new regime: 
 Although the party (ZANU-PF) had fought a long liberation 
struggle in certain ways along similar lines to those in Vietnam, 
China and Mozambique, one crucial distinction was that no 
permanent alternative agriculture production system had been 
established in liberated zones. In this sense, outside the externally-
based transit and refugee camps, little experience of organizing any 
production let alone socialist production has been gained by the 
party (Herbst, 1990:33). 
 
She continues to warn that prevailing ideas are also important in shaping change. The 
liberation movement in Zimbabwe espoused a socialist ideology similar to that 
adopted by governments in most of the continents ex-colonies. Albeit the country 
attained its independence late enough to learn something from the African policy 
errors, the swing to economic liberalisation had not yet commenced. It was during the 
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1980s that the African crisis deepened, and that communism collapsed in Eastern 
Europe, leaving even more regimes dependent on aid from Western countries and 
institutions (Jenkins, 1997:575-576). 
 
Whilst in exile, the liberation movement leaders knew that Rhodesia’s highly sophisticated 
agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors, if run competently, could provide 
tremendous resources, which could be used for the benefit of the impoverished black 
majority. After witnessing the effects of the sudden imposition of Frelimo’s revolutionary 
policies in Mozambique, Zimbabwe’s future leaders became aware that the nationalization 
and economic upheaval demanded by Mozambique-style socialism, and by much of their 
own rhetoric, would cause a flight of the white population and create economic chaos that 
would threaten the viability of strategic sectors of the economy. It was therefore clear to 
the new Zimbabwean leadership what they could not do. However, because their prime 
objective had been to win the liberation struggle, they never developed a comprehensive 
ideology, which would explain how the benefits available from a largely unchanged 
colonial economy could be used systematically to help the black population (Herbst, 
1990:32). 
 
Robert Mugabe`s address on 4 March 1980 to Zimbabweans and the world that his policy 
would be one of reform rather than revolution played a gigantic role in appeasing the 
international community and the county’s white minority. The ZANU-PF election 
manifesto, while referring to “the socialist transformation of Zimbabwean society”, had 
already pointed out that the capitalist system “cannot be transformed overnight”, and that 
private enterprise would have to continue for the time being. Mugabe indeed could draw 
conclusions from the trials of Zambia as well as of Mozambique, and was not averse to 
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learning from capitalist Kenya as well. The rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism that had been so 
boldly flaunted during the years of war now lay more lightly upon the new governments` 
arm. (Wills, 1990: 478). 
 
At the time of attainment of freedom, it was obvious that the white minority 
population would not be comfortable in a country that was to suddenly change hands. 
To many observers’ surprise, the new government bargained with the white people. 
The bargain was basically that the whites who are in independent Zimbabwe can stay, 
continuing to operate their businesses and farms, and lead the “colonial life style” that 
they are accustomed to for the rest of their lives. However, their children, in general, 
were discouraged from staying. The racial bargain was implicitly signalled by a 
myriad of government actions and statements, and a general atmosphere, which 
suggests that there is no economic future in Zimbabwe for most young whites. For the 
whites, the bargain was certainly the best racial policy from a Black government that 
they could possibly have expected (Herbst, 1990:222). Jenkins (1997: 575) asserts 
“history matters in the study of change. The path taken can eliminate options, because 
of inherited structures, institutions, ideologies, attitudes, and values (including 
apartheid, colonialism and nationalism)”. 
 
The United Nations, which continues to make socio-economic development issues a major 
priority, stated in its 1996 Human Development Report that the following conditions, 
which are identical to many African economies, were not conducive to economic 
development: 
• Jobless growth (growth which does not expand employment opportunities); 
• Ruthless growth (growth associated with increasing inequality and poverty); 
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• Voiceless growth (growth in the absence of democracy and empowerment); 
• Rootless growth (growth that withers cultural identity); and  
• Futureless growth (growth that squanders resources needed by future generations 
(UNDP, 1996). 
 
2.4. CHALLENGES TO STATE FORMATION IN AFRICA 
 
Doornbos (1990:180) as cited by Ng’ethe (1995: 254) puts forth the order that at the 
beginning of the third wave of African state collapse, writers have tended to assume 
that the African state has significant common characteristics. Inter alia, these include: 
• Its post-colonial status, with all the implications that it has for the evolution of 
civil society; 
• Its prior problematic relationship as regards its territorial jurisdiction; 
• Its heavy involvement in a restricted resource base (usually primary 
agriculture); 
• Its still relatively undifferentiated yet ethically heterogeneous social 
infrastructure; 
• Its salient processes of centralisation and consolidation of power by the ruling 
classes; and 
• Its pervasive external dependency. 
 
The state formation process in Africa is said to have had to face many challenges. 
These challenges were: 
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• The crisis of identity, through which the people learn to identify themselves as 
citizens of the nation state rather than as members of a particular ethnic sub-
group:  
• The crises of legitimacy or the development of the sense, on the part of the 
governed, that the government in power has the right to rule; 
• Development of the state capacity to enforce all decisions within it territorial 
jurisdiction;  
• The crisis of participation or the provision of means and opportunities for the 
citizens to influence state decisions; and 
• The crisis of distribution or the evolution of the will and the means to solve at 
least the most glaring aspects of social, political and especially, economic 
inequalities (Ngethe, 1995:253-255). 
 
2.4.1. CRISIS OF GOVERNACE 
Ngethe (1995) says that it can be argued convincingly that the state crisis in Africa 
today is as a result of external factors including the shrinking base of resources under 
the control of the state since the trade and debt crisis was set in motion in the early 
1970s. He goes on to say: 
In the Africa of the 1990s it is clear that there is a “crisis of the 
state”. This crisis goes beyond the early considerations of 
overdeveloped versus empirical state and soft versus hard state. 
One issue that poses the greatest challenge is the role of leadership 
and governance in the evolution and the resolution of the current 
crisis. Few, if any, scholarly discussions on state formation in 
Africa have addressed directly the relationship between such 
evolution or resolution and types of leadership Ng’ethe (1995:255). 
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According to Ng’ethe (1995:257) governance and economic and social factors have 
combined to lead to the collapse of the state. Examples of this assertion include 
Somalia, where the inability of the state to command enough resources to pay for its 
own well being seems to have contributed to state collapse. When Zaire (cum DRC) 
reached the brink of collapse, it could not collect taxes and as a result was unable to 
either feed the military or its civil servants. However, this was a result of the 
organisation institutional failure of the all powerful leader rather than absence of a 
resource base. 
 
Milliken and Krause (2003:13) add that state failure is causally linked to increased 
and rampant human suffering, instability and transitional threats of international 
organised crime and terrorism. During after the cold war, the majority of failed states 
were found in the third world. All forms of opposition were met with strong 
repressive force from the institutions of the state at the instruction of the government 
officials including the president of the country. The introduction of legislation e.g. the 
Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Access to Information and Privacy Act 
(AIPPA), the Broadcasting Services Act and the Labour Relations Amendment and 
the Private Voluntary Organisations Acts (Mhanda, 2002:155), legitimised these 
repressive acts. 
 
After the 2000 parliamentary elections and the 2002 presidential elections that were 
deemed unfair and illegitimate by the international community as well as other local 
organisations led to the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) imposing 
economic sanctions and travel restrictions on Mugabe and other high ranking officials in 
Zimbabwe (Johwa, 2005).  
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The political processes deteriorated even further in Zimbabwe when President 
Mugabe gazetted a regulation rendering most industrial activities as “essential 
services” and rendered strikes illegal. This led to a wide array of strikes throughout 
the country as workers and students protested (Bond and Manyanya, 2002:72). In the 
2000 election, the devious methods of “power maintenance” won ZANU the vote. 
Inter alia, these techniques were – applying fierce intimidation – including murder, 
torture and kidnapping, disallowing voter registration in the opposition’s strongholds, 
refusing access to election observers in some areas, deploying police in a biased way, 
getting rural headman to disqualify or intimidate pro-MDC voters, refusing youth the 
vote, and submitting bogus votes by overseas troops (Bond and Manyanya, 2002:76). 
 
The political crisis in Zimbabwe is manifested in many different and among others 
Diana Games (2005) makes mention of the signing into law of the Electoral Act 
which for the first time in the countries history gives the military a legal role in 
national elections. The allowing of minimal time to the opposition on the state-owned 
media also proved to be a desperate measure by the ruling party to obliterate the 
opposition by all means possible. The ruling party also violated the SADC guidelines 
by discouraging free political activity as the opposition had to apply for permission to 
hold public meetings. This permission was not always granted thus frustrating the 
opposition even more.  
 
As civil society has increasingly pushed for greater democracy and more participation in 
the decision-making process, the government has responded by tightening restrictions on 
the independent media and journalists and proposing legislation that would restrict the 
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operation of non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) including a prohibition on foreign 
funding for NGO’s engaged in human rights and/or governance work (USAID, 2005). 
 
2.4.2. DEFECTIVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
Ayittey (2003:321) argues that the failure of Africa to develop in the post- colonial 
era has little to do with alleged racial inferiority and other disruptive iniquities that 
came up as explanations for post-colonial African development malaise, but more to 
do with the defective economic and political systems established by African leaders 
after independence. 
 
Doornbos (2003:47) states that the collapse of a state can hardly occur spontaneously, 
or all at once. He goes on to say that if and where it happens, it is likely to have been 
preceded and initiated by complex and conflict redolent process of deterioration, 
decline and erosion of state functions.  
 
The post-colonial leadership that emerged from Africa as the saviours of the African 
people did not do much to enhance the continent’s economic and political growth 
trajectory. Generally, it became evident that when the post-colonial leadership took 
over the political and economic reigns Africa did not improve its economic and 
political status on the international stage, but instead occupied the creases of 
development. As much as this might be true, one would argue confidently that among 
other reasons colonisation itself was one of the noticeable reasons that led to Africa’s 
stalled development.   
 
The record of post-colonial African elites and the post-colonial state, throughout the 
1960s and 1970s was one of consolidating and legitimising neo-colonial and unequal 
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relations-reproducing underdevelopment and backwardness. Since the continent has 
been riddled with turmoil-with politics becoming warfare with conditions of 
instability, the stench of corrupt government, waste, poverty, uncertainty, 
disillusionment and violence encouraging military adventurists to hijack popular 
struggles in the majority of African states-democracy was thrown out of the political 
terrain in virtually all African states (Ihonvhere, 2003:293).  
 
According to Ayittey (2003:322-323), in many African countries the political systems 
established became increasingly repressive. “One man, one vote” became a one day 
wonder. African nationalists who waged the liberation struggle against the colonialists 
were hailed as heroes and swept into power with huge electoral majorities. But in case 
after case, they misused their parliamentary majority to subvert the constitution, 
declare their countries “one-party states” and themselves “presidents for life”. 
Opposition parties were outlawed. “Dissidents” were arrested and in some cases 
“liquidated”. In the light of the above, Since February 2000, when President Robert 
Mugabe suffered his first-ever national electoral defeat over a proposed new 
constitution, Zimbabwe has witnessed considerable political turmoil (Bond, 2002). 
 
According to Donovan (2002), political crisis reached appalling heights when food 
became scarce and only card bearing members of the ruling ZANU-PF could buy or 
receive donated food. Donovan (2002) further quotes Archbishop Pius Ncube, “This is 
forcing people to be dishonest”. The dishonesty manifested when people had to hold two 
political party subscriptions – one to get food (ZANU-PF) and one for political allegiance 
(MDC).  
 23 
In its bid to help the people of Zimbabwe, the United States government has taken the 
following steps: It has:  
• Delivered 216,840 metric tons of food relief to Zimbabwe in 2002, with 
additional food aid shipments underway.  
• Cut off government-to-government assistance and is instead delivering 
humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organizations.  
• Imposed travel restrictions on senior members of the Mugabe regime and 
others responsible for impeding Zimbabwe’s transition to a legitimate 
multiparty democracy.  
• Repeatedly condemned President Mugabe for his circumvention of the 
democratic process, the manipulation of the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance based on party affiliation, and the violations of basic human rights 
and civil liberties.  
• Provided Development Assistance and regional Economic Support Funds to 
promote democracy by increasing civil society’s ability to influence economic 
and political policy-making, especially in parliament and at local government 
levels (US Department of State, 2003). 
Not surprisingly, Mhanda (2003:154) attributes the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy 
to the failure of the ruling ZANU-PF to adjust to the new political terrain by transforming 
itself from a liberation movement to a modern political party in a democratic party system 
that it had endorsed and entrenched in a constitution. On the same vein the party was 
solely preoccupied with the retention of political power at the expense of the establishment 
of sound micro and macro economic policies and the total economic, political and cultural 
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liberation of the people of Zimbabwe. This was manifested in the reckless deployment of 
loyal party members in strategic positions and expertise seeking sectors of government. 
 
As business sense, common sense and the ability to delegate are supposed to be inherent in 
a business leader, this should be the case even with people entrusted with high political 
office as these instinctive attributes lead to better economic and value full government 
systems. In 1998, a study by the Central Statistical Office suggested that poverty had 
increased from 40.4 per cent in 1990.91 to 63.3 per cent by 1995/96. In terms of this Bill 
(Kubatana.net, 2002) a media owner or a journalist can be sent in prison for up to two 
years for various ill-defined offences such as: 
 
• concealing, falsifying or fabricating information 
• spreading rumours, falsehoods or causing alarm and despondency under the guise 
of authentic reports; 
• publishing a fabricated record of personal information; 
• denigrating, bringing into hatred or contempt or ridicule or to exciting 
disaffection against the President, the law enforcement agents or the 
administration of justice; rewriting a story that has already been published by 
another mass media service without the permission of that mass media owner. 
 
The 1980s were characterised by centralisation of state power. Examples can be found 
in government’s approach to wages and labour relations, land redistribution, and 
health management, amongst other issues. Examples include:  
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• attempts by government to impose its own leadership on the trade union 
movement. When this was resisted, government resorted to labour relations 
legislation to vest power in the State.  
• refusal to award title to resettled land. This meant that title was transferred 
from the private to the public domain. The effect was to place control in the 
hands of politicians and bureaucrats at the centre. 
• closing down the embryonic primary health care systems that hade developed 
before independence in some liberated areas, partly with impetus from 
guerrillas but largely as spontaneous developments at the village level. 
Employees of the Ministry of Health replaced elected village health workers, 
centralising power. 
• centralisation of control over the economy, newspapers, banks, some industrial 
businesses, some mines and so on (Davies, s.a.). 
 
Williams (2003:18) states that when the new African leaders got into power they sought to 
monopolies office. Their political rivalries usually had to make a choice between joining 
the ruling alliance or risking exclusion or even suppression. A case in hand is that of the 
Zimbabwe African People’s Union who realized the need to join the ruling alliance after 
their supporters had been violently beaten. 
 
Like many other African countries, Zimbabwe ZANU-PF formed a one party state 
claiming legitimacy from their leadership of the national struggle and the need to 
overcome ethnic and regional divisions and to write the people in pursuit of development 
and even socialism. The politics spoiled undermined state revenues and intensified the 
competition for state offices and resources. This led to the concentration of declining 
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resources and political power in fewer hands and increased political repression (Williams, 
2003:18) 
 
The political crisis in Zimbabwe was further manifested by the leadership crisis within the 
ruling ZANU-PF. This was illuminated in November 2004 when party leaders loyal to 
former parliamentary speaker Emmesson Mnangagwa alleged to lead a parliamentary 
caucus that would see parliament order President Robert Mugabe to resign. This was heard 
in the High court the same year. Jonathan Moyo, former Zimbabwean minister of 
Information, was among the alleged conspirators. Moyo was fired from the party as well 
as government after he chose to contest the 2005 general elections as an independent 
candidate for Tsholotsho in open defiance of senior party leaders who had blocked him 
from standing on the ruling party’s ticket, claiming that the said constituency was reserved 
for a woman candidate (Mail & Guardian, 2006e).     
 
2.5. CHARACTERISTICS OF A FAILED AFRICAN STATE 
It has become apparent over the years that the state in Africa has evolved in a unique  
way that has led to its failure. Unlike the other nations of the first world that had 
witnessed a natural evolution from the early state to the modern state of today, the 
African state can most unfortunately only relate to the contemporary state in the worst 
form possible.  
 
It is unfortunate that when the first African states became independent they never, in 
any considerable way, tried to redefine the “state theory” in a manner that would be 
uniquely for and conducive to the African different environments. The kind of 
leadership that the post-independence African leadership exhibited was no less 
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different from mass resource drainage and mass starvation of the peoples of Africa. 
Contrary to all popular expectations, post independence Africa was punctuated by 
corruption, starvation, fraud, coup de tat, mass killing and many other related 
atrocities.  
Ogbunwezeh (2005) outlines the traits of the failed state as follows:  
A state fails when:  
The government is infested by military kleptocrats or hijacked by pretenders; 
• There is a presence of internal conflict based on the consultation of the 
primordial forces. These primordial forces include the non-separation of 
religion and secular affairs and the elevation of nepotistic affinities over and 
above merit. This destroys merit and excellence; positioning the state to be 
hijacked by mediocrity and opportunism;  
• The government is dysfunctional unto meaningless to the citizenry, as a result 
of its inexcusable failure in its statutory functions; 
• The security services are always in league with the forces of social 
retrogression. The human rights of the citizens are treated with utmost disdain 
in this environment.  
 In addition to the above features of a failed state, Thürer, (1999) gives a three part 
description of a failed state: 
The political and legal approach 
 
• Firstly, there is the geographical and territorial aspect, namely the fact that 
“failed States” are essentially associated with internal and endogenous 
problems, even though these may incidentally have cross-border impacts.  
• Secondly, there is the political aspect, namely the internal collapse of law 
and order. The emphasis here is on the total or near total breakdown of 
structures guaranteeing law and order rather than the kind of fragmentation 
of State authority seen in civil wars, where clearly identified military or 
paramilitary rebels fight either to strengthen their own position within the 
State or to break away from it.  
 28 
• Thirdly, there is the functional aspect, namely the absence of bodies capable, 
on the one hand, of representing the State at the international level and, on 
the other, of being influenced by the outside world.  
The historical and developmental context 
The “failed States” existing at present are essentially Third World States 
which have been affected by three geopolitical factors: 
• the end of the Cold War, during which the two superpowers had often kept 
shallow-rooted regimes artificially in power, preserving them as potential 
allies through supplies of arms or through ideology-based power structures 
which kept the unity of the State intact by force; 
• the heritage of colonial regimes which had lasted long enough to destroy 
traditional social structures, but not long enough to replace them with 
Western constitutional structures and an effective identity as a new State; 
and lastly 
•  general processes of modernization which encouraged social and         
geographical mobility but were not counterbalanced by nation-building 
processes capable of placing the State on a firm foundation. 
 
The sociological perspective 
Sociologically, it is characterized by two phenomena: 
The first of these is the collapse of the core of government, which Max 
Weber rightly described as “monopoly of power”. In such States, the police, 
judiciary and other bodies serving to maintain law and order have either 
ceased to exist or are no longer able to operate. In many cases, they are used 
for purposes other than those for which they were intended. For example, in 
the Congo militias disintegrated into armed gangs of looters, military 
commanders set up in business on their own account using army units for 
their own enrichment, while State-owned economic resources were exploited 
for the private benefit of those in power. The second typical feature of a 
“failed State” is the brutality and intensity of the violence used. Eyewitness 
reports from Liberia speak of the whole society -- adults, young people and 
children alike -- falling into the grip of a collective insanity following the 
breakdown of State institutions Thürer, (1999:14).  
 
 
The above features can relatively be used to describe the situation in Zimbabwe as the 
situation in the country, even though maybe in a different way, befits the above 
description. 
 
2.5.1. CORRUPTION 
Among other reasons that have led to the collapse of the African state is the problem 
of corruption. Kpundeh (2004: 121) concurs, “In several African countries the effects 
of corruption have translated into political instability, frequent regime changes, and 
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unstable economic investment environment”. This statement can be used to describe 
the unstable milieu in Zimbabwe and can further be referred to when one puts forth 
the argument that corruption is one of the problems that successfully led to the state 
demise in the country.  
 
Kpundeh (2004: 121-122) further argues that, “The capacity of widespread corruption 
to erode the legitimacy of regimes and pose a profound threat not only to democratic 
systems but to all systems of government is closely linked to the fact that corruption is 
antidevelopmental: it diverts resources and efforts away from productive activities 
into rent-seeking, fosters negative incentives for investment, consolidates patronage 
networks as a principal form of influence of the state economic management, and 
suppress civil society and civil liberties. 
 
Due to extreme corruption in within the National Oil Company there were rampant 
riots to avert the corruption which led to fuel shortages and the increase in paraffin 
prices thus leading to many people without energy as the majority of the destitute use 
paraffin for everyday living (New International Magazine, 2001). The deployment of 
Zimbabwean troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been a financial drain 
in an already belt-tightening country. Albeit the people of Zimbabwe and part of the 
international community were opposed to this deployment, the government went 
ahead nonetheless (New International Magazine, 2004). 
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2.5.2. INADEQUATE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
 The ineffectiveness of current and past leaders of Africa to build political institutions, 
mobilise democratic participation, and manage dissent and opposition with 
democratic grace has contributed to the erosion of democratic legitimacy. It has in 
turn delayed, distorted, and diverted economic development and fostered glaring 
inequalities. 
According to a report prepared by The African Studies Centre:  
What is central to a failed state is that the state apparatus is 
unable to uphold effective monopoly of violence over its whole 
territory, lacks an effective judicial system to guard the rule of 
law and promulgate judgements that are internationally 
regarded as legitimate and sound (especially in commercial 
matters); is unable or unwilling to fulfil international 
obligations (such as debt repayment) and cannot prevent 
various forms of transnational economic crime or the use of its 
territory for the perpetuation of violence (politically motivated 
or otherwise) against other states in the international system 
(The African Studies Centre, 2003). 
 
The political crisis in Zimbabwe is not a first of its kind in the African continent but it 
can only be a unique case when we look at the causes of the crisis as many crises 
across the continent have had disparate causes that emanated from unique 
circumstances. Many crises in the African continent have been due to and correctly 
attributed to the colonisation of the African people by the French, the Belgians, the 
English, the Portuguese and other European nations. The English seem to be most 
mentioned when the debate around colonisation surfaces at whatever for a – and, as 
we are aware, they (the English) were the colonisers of the former Rhodesia cum 
Zimbabwe in 1980. 
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In the Zimbabwean case, the absence of good governance and institutions are often cited 
as the main causes for the crisis:  
In short, governance encompasses a states institutional arrangement, 
decision-making process, implementation capacity and relationship 
between government officials and the public. The dimensions of 
governance are political, technical and managerial. Establishing objectives 
and exercising leadership constitutes the political dimension. The utilization 
of natural and human resources, levels of education and manpower skills 
and industrial capacity represent the technical dimension. The capacity to 
get things done involves the institutional and managerial dimensions 
(Sachikonye, 1998:9).    
 
Institutional capacity for realistic and sensitive economic policy remains a major 
weakness. Second, there are very weak checks and balances between the different 
branches of government. Parliament for example has been more of a rubber-stamping 
institution than an important debating forum that provides a check on the excesses of 
the executive branch. This has been reflected in the quality of legislation put also the 
lack of accountability and transparency amongst the government ministries 
(Sachikoye, 1998:9).  
 
 2.6. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES – A PANACEA FOR 
DEVELOPMENT OR A TOOL FOR DESTRUCTION? 
 
One cannot fail to identify the traits of neoliberalism in the macro-economic policy of 
Zimbabwe, the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme that was adopted in the early 
1990s. These neoliberal policies that were as a result of the Washington Consensus, the 
(IMF, World Bank, the US Treasury, the US Federal Reserve and an array of political 
lobby groups and think-tanks) were funded by the large American banks and transnational 
corporations [AIDC, S.a.].   
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Pursuant to the above one would argue that the current crisis in Zimbabwe cannot be fairly 
dealt with if one does not, among other reasons, look at the economic underpinnings of 
this crisis. It seems as though SAPs are predicated upon the theory of neoclassical 
economics. Ekpo (2002) states, “neo-classical orthodoxy assumes that markets do clear 
and that competition with all its tenets drives an economy. Under this paradigm, the major 
function of the state is to ensure law and order; the state has no business in direct economic 
activity.” The World Bank and IMF, who are the advocates of free-market economics and 
the designers of SAPs, are in reality against the involvement of the state playing a major 
role in the economy of a country. Furthermore as one might possibly know, the major 
funders of these two institutions are the pioneers on neo-liberalism that goes hand in hand 
with free-market economics. Inter alia, these countries are the United Sates and Britain.  
 
On the same vein, Walker had this to say: 
One of the major reasons why the IMF and the World Bank were able to impose 
conditionality on borrowing country governments from 1979 onwards was the 
remarkable convergence of views among development economists, both inside and 
outside the International Financial Institutions, as to the causes of Africa’s economic 
problems and the appropriate response. The central dictums of the Washington 
Consensus were “get prices right,” and “shrink the state.” Getting prices right meant 
eliminating the sources of distortion of both macroeconomic prices (the exchange 
rate, interest rates, and wage rates) and more micro prices for goods and services 
(Walker , S.a.).  
 
In trying to explain the relationship between neoclassical economics and SAPs that are its 
consequence, Howard had this to say: 
The neoclassical micro foundations of SAPs, can be summarised in six propositions, 
including a focus on static efficiency, state neutrality/minimalism, distortions and 
marginality, a view that changes in relative prices lead to predictable outcomes, and 
development as a static equilibrium state. For example, the assumption of private 
actor optimization leads neoclassical theorists to focus on other explanations of why 
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economies are not operating at optimal levels. The search for blame leads to the 
identification of players influencing markets from outside the realm of exchanges. 
The reasoning leads ineluctably to the role of the state and how it affects the 
economy (Howard, 1999). 
 
The adoption of the orthodox ESAP in 1991 at the behest of the IMF and the World Bank 
saw Zimbabwe move from state interventionist economic development to free market 
economic development. Off course, with civil society not consulted at the adoption of the 
adjustment policy this was to bring problems. The following were the key targets of the 
ESAP: 
• Achieve GDP growth of 5 per cent during 1991-95; 
• Raise savings to 25 per cent of GDP; 
• Raise investment to 25 per cent of GDP 
• Achieve export growth of 9 per cent per annum; 
• Reduce the budget from over 10 per cent of GDP to 5 per cent by 1995; 
• Reduce inflation from 17.7 per cent to 10 per cent by 1995 (Kanyenze, 2003:56) 
 
The economic turmoil, as Davies (S.a.) states, became even more visible after the 
introduction of the ESAP, which had its section that dealt with social dimensions written 
elsewhere.  They also paid less attention to the social costs of the ESAP hence only three 
of the eight –one paragraphs in the Policy Statement announcing ESAP are devoted to 
social dimensions (Davies, S.a.). Furthermore, as a result of the introduction of these 
ESAPs the modus vivendi of Zimbabweans crashed thus leading to the withdrawal of the 
state, the pricing at prohibitive levels of social services as well as the deindustrialization of 
the economy (Bond, 2002).  
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When the ESAP came to the rescue, it was assumed that a combination of economic 
and political restructuring programmes, under the supervision of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank with emphasis on the implementation of 
orthodox monetarist programmes, would create an enabling environment that would 
promote democracy, stability, growth, accountability and development. It is obvious 
that when the West talks of democracy they mean liberal democracy, which in 
American terms is another term for capitalism (Ihonvbere, 2003:294). 
 
Afraid of the pressures from below and recognising that the alignment and 
realignment of political forces would deprive them of the lucrative and comfortable 
but exploitative locations in their respective political economies, African leaders have 
been quick to accept political prescriptions from the West. In the majority of 
instances, they have had no choice (Ihonvbere, 2003:294). Referring to Zimbabwe, by 
1997 the ESAP had failed to meet its original objectives relating to growth rate, job 
creation, containing the budget deficit and reducing poverty. Lest we forget, in June 
1992 the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions had organised demonstrations against 
the same ESAP, which had begun to erode incomes, to raise the cost of living and to 
force firms to retrench. At this time, the national mood was that there should be “no 
taxation without consultation” and that “enough was enough” (Sachikonye, 1998:8). 
 
2.7. THE LAND PROBLEM- A ROLAND FOR AN OLIVER 
 
Land is not just a factor of production. Land and rights to land are enveloped on a 
host of political, institutional, and sociological networks that give it a meaning far 
beyond its market (economic) value (Sibanda, 1979:27). 
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The land crisis in Zimbabwe did not only begin in the late 1970s and in earnest at the 
adoption of the Lancaster House agreement. If one follows the land debate in 
Zimbabwe one might have noticed that the African person in Zimbabwe was stripped 
of the best and arable land from the early 1920s when the British granted self-
government to the whites in former Southern Rhodesia (Sibanda, 1979:18). 
.  
Sibanda (1979:18) continues to say that the Land Appropriation Act of 1930 gave 
large amounts of fertile land to the white farmers and the less little and less palatable 
land was allocated to the black Zimbabweans. Due to many reasons among them the 
quality of land was very poor and in terms of soil and climate, and had to carry an 
increasing population and rising numbers of livestock which accelerated soil erosion. 
One other reason which is also a South African phenomenon was the migrant labour 
system which began as result of the land deteriorating to such an extent that even the 
produce from subsistence production could not sustain the black rural farming 
communities. 
 
Since its inception in 1923, the land Apportionment Act had had many amendments 
made to it and in 1964 the land in the former Rhodesia was divided as follows: 
Furthermore, after the amendments referred to above the Land Apportionment Act of 
1979 was replaced in 1969 when the Land Tenure Act was gazetted.  
 
The land crisis in Zimbabwe is many a time attributed to the Lancaster House 
agreement, which was adopted by both the white minority group as well as the black 
majority of Zimbabweans in 1979. This controversial agreement constitutionally 
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protected the rights of the white “colonialists” especially the property rights of the 
minority white farmers (Raftopoulos and Compagnon, 2003:16-17).  
 
The land question seems to be one major cause of the crisis in Zimbabwe (Glantz 
(2003). Raftopoulos and Compagnon (2003:16-17) state that the seizure of white 
owned farms, save the drought which contributed minimally to the food crisis, by the 
government supported war veterans led to the steep drop in food production. Even 
worse, as a result of the land redistribution programme large scale commercial 
farming which accounted for approximately up to 90 per cent of the national beef 
exports is expected to have declined by 70 per cent from 1.3 million in December 
2001 to 400,000 in July 2002. 
 
In 2002, the government made an about turn when Flora Buka, the minister of state 
for special affairs responsible for land, land reform and resettlement, confirmed that 
all Zimbabweans, including white commercial farmers could not apply for land. The 
predominantly white Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) said there appeared to be “a 
conducive environment to progress with their matter” (MKG, 2006). 
 
In its report, Justice for agriculture states that a number of Zimbabwean farmers have 
sought their fortunes elsewhere in the region: 35 to 45 in Mozambique and about 50 
in Malawi. Others left for South Africa and Botswana; 12 to 15 had even travelled to 
Nigeria ((Mail and Guardian, 2006a). 
 
Seeing that the land was a central issue in the liberation struggle, the new government 
had to devise a plan to redistribute the land. As a result in April 1980, the government 
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initiated a programme to resettle 18 000 families on approximately 1,1 million 
hectares of land at a cost of $60 million, Half of this programme was to be funded by 
the British government , while Zimbabwean would pay for the remainder. Given the 
clear inadequacy of this programme in the country with 800 000 families facing 
severe land pressures, the government soon decided to embark on a much more 
ambitious programme. In the three-year Transitional National Development Plan 
published in November 1982 and covering the period 1983-5, the new government 
stated its intention to resettle at least 162000 peasants, ‘subject to practical financial 
and economic constrains’. This was an exceedingly ambitious goal because it would 
have meant resettling almost 20 per cent of all peasants in the nation (Herbst, 
1990:43). 
 
Mayo & Matondi (2003:74) argue that land conflicts have a long history spanning 
over a century. He lashes out that many the less informed or less honest discussions 
today lean toward presenting the current land conflicts as a new phenomenon, despite 
persistent intense conflicts over land, sometimes involving violence both before and 
after independence. He illustrates this in table 2.3  below: 
Table 2.1. A synopsis of conflicts over land in Zimbabwe since 1980. 
Period   Issue Type of conflict                        
1980-1985  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1986-1989 
 
 
 
Rehabilitation, transition. 
Accelerated resettlement 
schemes. 
Selection of the beneficiary of 
land reform. 
Prime Minister’s directive 
creating VIDCOs and 
WARDCOs. 
 
 
 
 
Black bidding for equal 
opportunities, affirmative action, 
and empowerment. 
Growing demand for land 
Squatting on abandoned farms. 
Some people not taking 
government reconciliation 
policies seriously. 
People unwilling to accept 
resettlement (minda miferu-long 
fields) because of fear of 
working for government benefit. 
Conflicts between new 
institutional structures and 
traditional leaders. 
 
Intolerance toward squatters. 
Violence against farm workers. 
Government prosecution of 
stream bank cultivators. 
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1990-1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997-2000 
expressed through stream bank 
cultivation and natural resources 
poaching. Subsides on 
agriculture 
111treatment of farm workers, 
poor social services (housing 
education, and health). 
 
Land use (what is the most 
suitable land use in the prime 
lands).  
Land pressure as more workers 
are retrenched. 
Farm leases.  
Evictions for development of 
infrastructure. 
Compensation for contributing 
to the liberation struggle.  
Land acquisition. 
Beneficiary selection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stakeholder participation in the 
land reform. 
Donor conference.  
ICFSS origin, beneficiaries, 
transparency. 
Progressive increases in land 
occupations. 
Land and the constitution.  
Rejection of the constitution. 
Amendment to the constitution. 
 
Slow progress in meeting land 
reform targets. Subsides seen as 
a drain, yet government felt it 
had a   
Social responsibility to its 
citizenry. 
 
 
Negative state view of wildlife 
in prime lands. 
Farmers diversifying into 
wildlife. 
Growing squatting in communal 
areas. More natural resources 
poaching. Farmers punishing 
villagers, ill treating them for 
trespassing. Corruption in the 
issuing of government leases. 
Political driven evictions. Farm 
leases and the wider society’s 
negative view of them. Conflicts 
between farmers and 
government as farmers 
contested. 
Farm workers, woman disabled 
and youths who are excluded 
and engage in confrontation.  
 
 
Reactionary civil society 
movement. Donor conference 
promised too much but 
delivered too little. 
Disagreement as to who pays for 
land and capital Improvements 
Elites getting larger benefits 
from land reform. 
Disagreement on criteria and 
procedures on land acquisition 
prevent peaceful resolution. 
Farmers against the war 
veterans. 
Government support of the war 
veterans. 
Compulsory acquisition and 
change of constitution. 
Rule of law in 2000 versus rule 
of law before independence.  
Party contestation and tensions 
over land reform. 
 
Source: Mayo & Matondi (2003:75) 
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Since the late 1990s, there have been five means of acquiring land either proposed or 
implemented. The first approach entails depending on the market to purchase land on 
a willing seller, willing buyer basis. This was the dominant method used in the 1980s, 
and donors, and commercial farmers still strongly promote it while it is resisted by the 
government and other stakeholders. The second approach is compulsory acquisition, 
whereby the government gazettes land for acquisition and only pays for 
improvements to the land and not for the land itself, with the obligation to pay for the 
land being placed on the United Kingdom to compensate for its role in colonial 
expropriation. This approach is favoured by the government and by some segments of 
civil society but opposed by the commercial farmers and donors. The third approach 
involves negotiated sales, whereby, individual farmers and government negotiate a 
sale of the land or a snap of one of the farms owned by the individual farmer. Some 
commercial farmers supported this approach. The fourth approach relied on individual 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to devise their own way of land acquisition 
and resettlement in consultation with government. The final approach is land 
occupation, whereby individual and groups occupy private or state land and allocate 
themselves stands or plots (Mayo and Matondi, 2003:76-77). 
 
It become apparent that the fifth approach was the popular one as war veterans 
spearheaded land occupations, while combination of different ‘levels of government, 
politicians and traditional leaders either support their actions or other evictions. 
Landholders, donors and many other groups in Zimbabwe who want stability are 
against occupations. Differing forms of land acquisition are also coloured by political 
competition. Before the June 2000 parliamentary elections ZANU-PF leaders were 
calling for a speedy reclamation of land from the whites and supporting the land 
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occupations, while leaders of the MDC called for a more orderly process of land 
resettlement (Mayo and Matondi, 2003:77). 
 
The ESAP, which failed to integrate the need for land reform in its design, introduced 
new sources of conflict (and aggravated old ones) with direct implications for the land 
question. The programme reinforced an extremely inequitable land ownership 
structure, and it soon become apparent that the mostly white commercial farmers were 
the main beneficiaries of reforms promoting production for export markets. 
Furthermore, the ESAP had the effect of altering land use practices which created new 
demands for land and new sources of conflict between white and black elite with easy 
access to capital. Another effect of the ESAP has been to internationalise interests in 
the land question through the introduction of stock-owning and shareholder 
arrangements, introducing yet another source of conflict in the land equation and 
creating new allies for commercial farmers. The intrusion of foreign interests in the 
land question has added yet another layer of complexity in terms of national politics 
(Mayo and Matondi (2003:83).  
 
When commercial farms were seized the major recipients were the members of the 
ruling elite. After a wave of forceful evictions, at least 150 farmers had been forced 
off their properties at the end of April 2002. Among others, the recipients of these 
unlawful takeovers were: Vice-President Joseph Msika; defence Minister Sydney 
Sekeramayi; Higher Education Minister Samuel Mumbegegwi; retired Brigadier and 
MP, Ambrose Mutinhi; politburo member, General Solomon Mujuru MP and brother 
of Joshua Nkomo, Stephen Nkomo; Deputy Minister of Higher Education (who seized 
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Botharus farm, a safari enterprise of 27000 acres in Beit Bridge), Kembo Mohadi and 
Obriel Mpofu, a provincial governor (Good, 1997:150). 
 
The constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No.11) of 1990 allows for land, 
including utilised land, buildings, and improvements to land, to be acquired for 
resettlement, land reorganisation, environmental conversation, the utilisation of 
natural resources, or the relocation of persons, whereas previously only under-utilised 
land could be acquired for resettlement. Specifically, Section 16 (1) of the 
Constitution, as amended requires: 
in the case of land or any interest or right therein, that the acquisition 
is reasonably necessary for the utilization of that or any other land-  
A for settlement for agricultural or other purposes; or B. for purposes 
of land reorganization, forestry, environmental conservation or the 
utilization of wild life or other natural resources; or C. for the 
relocation of persons dispossessed in consequence of the utilization 
of land for a purpose referred to in subparagraph A or B; or (ii) in the 
case of any property, including land, or any interest or right therein, 
that the acquisition is reasonably necessary in the interests of 
defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, 
town and country planning or the utilization of that or any other 
property for a purpose beneficial to the public generally or to an of 
the public; and (b) requires the acquiring authority to give reasonable 
notice of the intention to acquire the property, interest or right to 
person owning the property or having any other interest or right 
therein that would be affected by such acquisition; and (c) subject to 
the provisions of subsection (2), requires the acquiring authority to 
pay fair compensation for the acquisition before or within a 
reasonable time after acquiring the property, interest or 
right…(Naldi, 1993:589). 
Section 16 (2), as amended, also aroused controversy because it seeks to oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts. Specifically, it provides that: 
A law referred to in subsection (1) which provides for the 
compulsory acquisition of land where it occurs for the first time and 
the substitution of "described in the proviso to subsection (l)(f), or 
any interest or right in such land, may- (a) specify the principles on 
which, and the manner in which, compensation for the acquisition of 
the land or interest or right therein is to be determined and paid; (b) 
fix, in accordance with principles referred to in paragraph (a), the 
amount of compensation payable for the acquisition of the land or 
interest or right therein; (c) fix the period within which compensation 
shall be paid for the acquisition of the land or interest or right 
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therein; and no such law shall be called into question by any court on 
the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not fair 
(Naldi, 1993:589). 
 
It was inevitable that these amendments, among others, would prove controversial, 
and they even attracted criticism from senior members of the judiciary (Naldi, 
1993:588-589).  
2.8. THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT 
After decades of fighting and resistance, majority rule finally saw its inception in 1980 
after the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement which was a compromise between the 
white minority and the black majority. The agreement formed the basis for the first 
constitution of the country that was to be named Zimbabwe after years of bearing the name 
of Southern Rhodesia and Rhodesia. The new government that came into power in 1980 
was led by ZANU-PF which was the biggest liberation movement in the country. As this 
was the first time that this group of liberation movement leaders were to run a country, 
they were faced by many challenges ranging from inexperience with government issues to 
formal administration matters.  
 
2.9. ZIMBABWE’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC COLLAPSE  
One cannot adequately or comprehensively explain the political plight in the former 
Rhodesia without intensively looking into the socio-economic turmoil in the country. The 
socio-economic realities of Zimbabwe have in one way or the other propelled the political 
unrest and further awakened the ‘majority’ of Zimbabweans to the economic as well as the 
political realities.  
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The Zimbabwean economy suffered a setback after the seizure of white owned farms in 
2002. As a result of these evictions the economy was reported to have plummeted to an 
extent where the Gross Domestic Product was expected to fall by $1.12 billion in 2002. 
This was made even worse in June the same year when Mugabe ordered some 2900 
commercial farmers to seize all productive activities including some 24000 hectares of 
vital wheat and the cattle that they owned. As a result at least 232000 farm-workers were 
rendered jobless ass starvation rose in the land (Good, 1997:150).  
 
During the reform period (1997/8), the eight largest parastatals had a combined deficit of 
Z$11billion.  The National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) (Z$5.5billion), the 
Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) (Z$2.2billion), the National Railways of 
Zimbabwe (NRZ) (Z$703.1million), and the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) 
(Z$688.4 million) were the major loss makers. Albeit the government attributed these 
ignominious losses to management inefficiencies, exchange rate depreciation, inadequate 
pricing policies, inappropriate investments and the unfavourable macro-economic 
environment, it was quite obvious that even though not officially mentioned corruption 
was one of the causes of the losses. This led to the country having to borrow heavily to 
such an extent that at the end of 1998 the country had an external debt of Z$90billion 
(Kanyenze, 2003:59). 
 
Amongst other things unemployment generally impacts negatively on the political and 
economic well being of a country and Zimbabwe as a country more especially in Africa is 
also affected by this assertion. The problem of unemployment is not something new in 
Zimbabwe that the African is now in power but it is today even worse. Zimbabwe was, 
during the time of the Federal government faced with the crisis of unemployment to such 
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an extent that the state appointed the Southern Rhodesian Labour Adviser, Mr. G.E. Sent 
to examine the crisis. This happened during the economic recession in 1958-59 (Clarke, 
1978:6). 
Statistics from the Government of Zimbabwe show that as at 1995, female formal 
sector employment stood at only 2% of the national population, while their male 
counterparts constituted 10% of the same. Unemployment rates are higher in urban 
areas, due to rural-urban migration. Those self-employed in agriculture in rural areas, 
mainly women, remain behind whilst men seek employment in urban areas. The table 
below provides illustrative unemployment data from two of Zimbabwe's major cities 
(Harare and Bulawayo) and the country's largest urban township. 
Table 2.2. : Unemployment in Major Urban Centres. 
 
Urban Centre             Percentage Unemployed  
  Total  Men Women  
Harare 20.0% 17.0% 25.5% 
Bulawayo 24.0% 20.6% 32.5% 
Chitungwiza 27.8% 22.0% 38.4% 
 
Source: UNDP, 1997 
Furthermore, Bond asserts: 
Inter alia, the political events of 1997 that saw the war veterans run wildly with big 
smiles on their faces led to the spurring the economic avalanche in a country that had 
an inflation rate that rose from 15% in September to 45% in eighteen months. In 1997 
Robert Mugabe silenced approximately 50 000 liberation war veterans, who were on 
a campaign to challenge his legitimacy as President of the party and the state, by 
offering them Z$50,000 each accompanied by a monthly pension of Z$2,000. This 
resulted in state-wide unrest as this was at the expense of the majority of those who 
were not liberation war veterans. Because of these payouts, sales taxes (income tax 
and petrol tax increase) were imposed to help recover the costs (Bond, 2000).  
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The table below illustrates how Zimbabwe has declined in virtually all aspects of 
socio-economic well-being:  
Table: 2.3. Zimbabwe Statistics. 
Fact/Statistic    1982    1992    Estimate for 2002 
People With 
HIV/AIDS    3%     10%         33.7% 
Unemployment 
Rate   13%     35%         80% 
Exchange Rate  $1 = Z$1 $1 = Z$2.5     $1 = Z$1,300 
Number of People 
Facing Starvation   400,000    100,000        7.2 million 
People Living in 
Poverty     N/A     25.5%         75% 
Agricultural 
Annual Growth     3.5%       2%       - 12% 
Life Expectancy 
(in years)    51.8     41.35         37.7 
    
 
 
Source: IMF World Bank, 2002. 
 
In his research report, Sachikonye (2005:6) alludes to the deterioration of some key social 
indicators in Zimbabwe where, in recent years, the country’s human development index 
(HDI), which picked as 0.621, declined to 0.551 in 2000. The country slid from 111th in 
1990 to 130th in 1998 and then to 147th in 2003 in the global HDI rankings. Life 
expectancy at birth is estimated at 43 years for the period 2000-2005 as compared to 61 
years in 1990 with about 33% adult population HIV positive. 
 
The decline in the country’s economic opportunities has been minored in negligible 
foreign investment inflows, low export earnings and a shortage of foreign exchange, fuel 
and other key inputs. In sectors such as manufacturing, there is capacity underutilization. 
The relative contribution to Gross Domestic Product of various sectors was 18% by 
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agriculture, 18% by industry, 4% by mining and 60% by services. As a result of the 
manner in which the fast-track land reform was implemented, the country saw a significant 
decline in agricultural output between 2000 and 2004. Not only was food production but 
also there was a considerable decline in tobacco and other crop exports (Sachikonye, 
2005:6-7). 
 
As the politics and economic situation in the country were on the brick of collapse, the 
social conditions were as well missed. New Hope Zimbabwe, a local NGO providing 
community assistance to the needy, stated that it had recorded 500 cases of severe 
malnutrition every week in Epworth, one of the capitals’ poorest suburbs. Nation 
malnutrition statistics are hard to access in Zimbabwe. However, according to the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), there is a strong association between severe 
malnutrition and HIV/AIDS. About 70% of children admitted to hospital for severe 
malnutrition are also HIV positive (Mail &Guardian 2006c). 
 
Contrary to the Central Bank Governor Gideon Gomo’s forecast in January 2006 that 
inflation would peak over 800% in March before receding to below 500% in June of the 
same year and declining to double digits next year, economist saw no reversal in the trend 
that has sent living conditions plummeting with inflation at a second high of 913.6% in 
March 2006 (Mail & Guardian, 2006d). 
 
In trying to save the economy, the ZANU-PF government launched an economic recovery 
plan called the National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP). Not 
surprising, Jonathan Moyo described the programme as ill fated not only because it is too 
similar to its failed predecessors, but also because it does not address core of Zimbabwe’s 
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deepening crisis: ZANU-PF’S triple trap and its consequences which have left Mugabe 
like a spider trapped in its web. Moyo defines the triple trap as the combined crippling 
effect of Mugabe’s failure to make way for a successor Zimbabwe’s growing international 
isolation and its collapsed economy (Mail & Guardian, 2006h). 
 
 According to the NEDPP, the state wants to raise US$2, 5 billion mainly from the sale of 
failing state enterprises, reducing inflation and stimulating between 1% and 2% economic 
growth over the next six to eight months in an economy that has consistently registered 
negative economic growth over the past six years, during which it has shrunk by more than 
35% (Mail & Guardian, 2006h). 
 
It is saddening to note that in diplomatic circles especially at the UN the AU and the 
SADC Zimbabwe has moved from a divisive talking point to an object of pity. The 
international question now in where the economic meltdown will lead to a political 
meltdown. Even in countries that the government has identified as friendly such as 
Malaysia, India, China, Iran and Indonesia, there are indications that may have lost interest 
either to do business or to help Mugabe as they have come to Harare and found a collapsed 
economy (Mail & Guardian, 2006f). 
 
The country in 2005, was completing its sixth consecutive year of economic decline, white 
Sub-Saharan Africa recorded an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 
3.4%. Zimbabwe’s failure to address fundamental economic problems means that G.D.P is 
expected to decline by a further 5.2% in 2004 (USAID, 2005). 
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2.10. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
 
This chapter has discussed the socio-economic and political dynamics that have led to the 
political crisis that became noticeable in the early to mid 1990s only to deteriorate in the 
mid 2000s. Evidence is abound as discussed, that there has been a decline in the economic 
activity and viability that had given the country its economic and political stability from 
the days of independence. As a result of this decline the country was plunged into a 
political crisis as the ruling elites wanted to maintain power by all means possible. 
Disorder, corruption, mal-administration, censorship, arson, and other undesirable 
measures were adopted to keep the ruling elites afloat. These measures led to the 
mobilisation of the masses under the auspices of the Movement for Democratic Change 
against the government and to try to usher in a new political order.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an outline of the research methodology that has been used 
throughout this study. It consists of the following sections: research design, sampling, 
validity and reliability of documents, procedures for data collection, participants and 
ethical considerations. 
 
3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This case study focuses on Zimbabwe from 1995 to 2005 although it looks at the 
historical development of events before and after independence where necessary. Yin 
defines a case study as: 
An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident. The case study copes with a situation in 
which there will be many more variables of interest than 
data points, relies on multiple sources of evidence and as a 
result benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 
1994:13). 
 
 
 
The case study has given guidance to the researcher to collect analyse and interpret 
data towards a better comprehension of the causes of the political crisis in Zimbabwe. 
This study reviews relevant literature that gives a clear directive to the study. 
Qualitative research techniques have been used throughout this study. This study is a 
descriptive type of research, which according to Babbie and Mouton is the type of 
research where “the researcher observes and then describes what was observed. 
Because scientific observation is careful and deliberate, however, scientific 
descriptions are typically more accurate and precise than casual ones” (Babbie and 
Mouton, 2001:80).  
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Documents such as legal documents, books, newspapers and other documents at the 
researcher’s disposal were used to collect qualitative data.  Additional qualitative data 
was obtained through interviews with experts on Zimbabwean politics and economics. 
Expert interviews have been of significance in this study as experts normally 
represent a group of people who are experts in a given field e.g. political economy, 
state failure, etc. In order to give a wide berth to deviation from the research question 
the researcher provided an interview guide.  
 
Flick (2006:165) states that the interview guide has a much stronger directive function 
with regards to excluding unproductive topics. On the same vein, Flick (2002:77) 
quotes Meuser and Nagel (2002), “The work, which goes into developing an 
interview guide, ensures that researchers do not present themselves as incompetent 
interlocutors. The orientation to an interview guide also ensures that the interview 
does not get lost in topics of no relevance and permits the expert to extemporise his or 
her issue and views on matters”.  
 
 Non-scheduled interviews became a useful tool in terms of getting the general 
perspective of the experts, as the only interruption from time to time was only to give 
directive to the respondents and not to influence their perspective. Telephone 
interviews were also used for those respondents that were far but had their 
contribution of utmost importance to the research.   
 
Bless and Higson-Smith bear testimony to the advantages of the non-sheduled 
interviews as they, in their book, Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: an 
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African Perspective, write, “Those interviewed are free to expand on the topic as they 
see fit, to focus on particular aspects, to relate their own experiences, and so on. 
Usually no time limit is fixed to complete an interview”. (Bless and Higson-Smith, 
1995, 107).  
 
3.3. SAMPLING AND PROCEDURE 
The researcher has purposively selected respondents from, political experts or 
analysts and business people who have knowledge about the political situation in 
Zimbabwe. These people were interviewed over the telephone as well as 
electronically with the aid of the e-mail. Stratified sampling method has been used to 
obtain a greater degree of representativeness in as far as the respondents are 
concerned. Babbie and Mouton (2001:191) define stratified sampling as, “a method 
for obtaining greater representativeness – decreasing the probable sampling error”.  
Apart from the document study that is extensively articulated in Chapter 2, the following 
categories of respondents were interviewed: politicians (3), academics (4), business people 
(4) ,, economists (2) and political analysts (4) or experts were interviewed.  A total number 
of 17 people from different sectors were interviewed. The sample was purposively selected 
and was representative of all the groups of people that are conversant with the politics and 
economics of Zimbabwe. 
 
In trying to ensure that the participants gave as much information as possible, open-
ended questions were used to guide the interviewer. Virtually all the participants were 
given 30 minutes each to answer the questions. The participants were able to answer 
all the questions in a thorough manner within this time. 
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3.4. METHODS FOR DATA COLLECTION 
Face to face e-mail and telephone interviews, as defined above, were used to collect data 
from the relevant people. For some of the respondents that I could not be able to reach due 
to their busy schedules or other reasons I have made use of the telephone. The telephone 
interviews lasted no less than 20 minutes, as I believe that this time would afford the 
respondents ample time to give justice to the questions posed. Creswell (2003: 185) 
accentuates that interviews are of advantage as participants can provide historical 
information as well as allow the researcher control over the line of questioning. In cases 
where the respondents could not be reached by telephone due to many reasons ranging 
from tight schedules to respondents spending most of their time traveling, the interview 
schedule was sent to them by e-mail. With optimum use of the library the study also made 
use of books as well a variety of journals were used to get the opinion of other scholars on 
the subject in question 
 
3.5. VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF DOCUMENTS. 
Since documents are written by people with different motives and some written with 
objectivity and subjectivity, it is of utmost importance that documents be checked for 
validity and reliability. Validity of the documents studied is usually increased by the 
fact that documents are often first person accounts of events or feelings experienced 
by the author. These documents have the propensity of having face validity (Bailey, 
1994:317). Bailey (1994:319) says of reliability,” …reliability may be checked either 
by similar documents at two or more points in time (instrument reliability) or by 
comparing the results of two or more researchers at the same point in time (analyst 
reliability).  
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In addition to the document study, interviews were used to collect qualitative data.  
Additional qualitative data was obtained through interviews with key players in 
international political economy e.g. economists, political analysts and other individuals 
who are conversant with the politics of Zimbabwe.  Non-scheduled interviews, which are 
explained by Bless and Higson-Smith (1995:107) as interviews, “that consist of asking 
respondents to comment on widely defined issues”, were a useful tool in terms of getting 
the general perspective of the respondents, as the only interruption from time to time was 
to give directive to the respondents and not to influence their perspective. Telephone 
interviews were also used for those respondents that were far but had their contribution of 
utmost importance to the research. In addition to the above, face-to-face interviews which 
are defined by Babbie and Mouton (2001:249) as “interviews where the researchers send 
the interviewers to ask the questions orally and record respondents’ answers” were also 
conducted with great success. 
 
Bless and Higson-Smith bear testimony to the advantages of the non-scheduled interviews 
as they, in their book, Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: An African Perspective, 
write, “Those interviewed are free to expand on the topic as they see fit, to focus on 
particular aspects, to relate their own experiences, and so on. Usually no time limit is fixed 
to complete an interview” (Bless and Higson-Smith, 1995: 107). 
 
 3.6. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Throughout this study, the researcher has completely adhered to the ethical 
considerations of social research. The privacy and confidentiality of the respondents’ 
data was guaranteed before the research was conducted as well as after the completion 
of the study. Not even at a single moment were the respondents coerced to comply 
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with the requirements of the research against their will. Furthermore, the anonymity 
of the respondents was guaranteed at all times. 
 
3.7. DATA ANALYSIS 
The data collected for this study has been analysed qualitatively. Rock (1982) as cited 
in Mouton (1996:166-167) in relation to qualitative social enquiry assets that 
symbolic interactionism accentuates three fundamental features of social life. The first 
trait states that people can make reflexive use of the symbols they employ i.e. they 
can interpret and unravel the meanings of events without reacting to them; the second 
one states that people are symbolic objects to themselves as they constantly construct, 
judge and modify themselves as social entities and the third trait states that 
perspectives and plans emerge from the interplay between a socially constructed self 
and a socially constructed environment. He asserts that selves are lent an additional 
structure by their location in time. 
 
The researcher has used symbolic interactionism which is mainly concerned with four 
levels of analysis i.e. first  is the ways in which the self renders its environment 
socially significant, is transformed by such a rendition and construes the environment 
anew; second is the way in which social worlds are built by negotiated perspectives 
that continually redefine reality; third is the manner in which social worlds influence 
one another and make new constellations of meaning possible’ and lastly is the 
relationship between such worlds and the larger, overriding symbolism that lends 
coherence to society (Mouton, 1996: 166). 
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In addition, the researcher ’s qualitative analysis focuses on four areas viz. first is 
understanding rather than explaining social actions and events within their particular 
settings and contexts; second is remaining true to the natural setting of the actors and 
the concepts they use to describe and understand themselves; third is constructing, 
with regard to the social world, stories, accounts and theories that retain the internal 
meaning and coherence of the social phenomenon rather than breaking it up into its 
constituent components and finally to contextually give valid accounts of social life 
rather than formerly generalisable explanations.(Mouton, 1996: 167). 
 
 
3.8. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
The chapter outlines how the researcher has gone about the study from the gathering 
of the necessary information to the analysis of the information collected. The better 
part of the chapter gives justification for the research design that the researcher has 
used i.e. the qualitative methodology. The study mainly utilised documents and 
interviews to come to its logical conclusion. The internet (e-mail) as well as the 
telephone was used as the main instruments for primary data collection. Prominent 
and competent individuals were interviewed. These included scholars and individuals 
who have written extensively on the political economy of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, 
the method of analysis that the researcher has used to analyse the information at hand 
has also been discussed i.e. qualitative analysis in general and thematic analysis 
specifically.  
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS. 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The previous chapter presented the research design that was followed when the 
researcher was making his enquiry. This chapter now presents the analysis and 
interpretation of the data that was collected as empirical evidence to answer the 
research questions posed earlier in chapter one. In this chapter, the researcher 
interprets and analyses the data using the thematic analysis that is commonly known 
as the systematic and interpretative analysis of data. This chapter is discussed around 
five themes: the colonial legacy, crisis of governance, the Lancaster House agreement 
and the land question, the crisis of elites, structural adjustment programmes and 
corruption and fraud as well as South African quiet diplomacy. These themes have 
been derived from the literature that was reviewed in chapter two as well as the 
documents that explain the theory of organic crisis as it is the basis for this study. The 
analysis is quite significantly predicated on the primary information sourced from the 
respondents.  
 
4.2. RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
The respondent’s responses to the research questions can be summarised as follows: 
4.2.1 What have been the primary reasons for the political crisis in Zimbabwe 
between 1995 and 2005? 
The respondents were unanimous in asserting that the Zimbabwean crisis emanated or 
was as a result of political reasons such as the failure of political leadership; economic 
reasons such as the adverse impact of neoliberal policies (SAPs) as well as social 
reasons such as the failure to integrate war veterans into society.  
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4.2.2 What role has the political elite played in the country’s development? 
It is apparent that there was no well articulated policy for the country after 
independence hence there was a considerable economic breakdown in the late 1980s. 
The betrayal of people’s aspirations by the ruling elites was one of the causes of the 
peoples “rebellion against the state. This was manifested when the people, represented 
by various civil society organisations were not consulted when the SAP was being 
made.  
 
4.2.3 What contribution did the Structural Adjustment Programme make to the 
economic development of Zimbabwe? 
All respondents were agreed that the SAP failed the people of Zimbabwe in many 
respects among which was the demise in social services provision as the plan 
privatised some of the state owned enterprises thus making access to social services 
expensive. In general SAPs contributed significantly to the economic decline in 
Zimbabwe which can explicitly be linked to the political crisis.  
 
4.2.4 Are there any other important factors that have played a role in the 
development process of Zimbabwe? 
It seems as though Africa as a whole under the banner of the African Union has failed 
the Zimbabwean people as it did not do much but relatively support Mugabe in his 
quest to place the blame on imperialist forces. Again closer to home the Southern 
African Development Corporation (SADC) also did not have the courage and will to 
bring about stability in the country but continued to support a regime that had lost its 
legitimacy in the face of famine and political impasse. To make matters worse South 
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Africa, which is regarded as a “saviour” in Southern Africa at least, failed to act 
decisively in trying to bring about stability in a country that virtually depended on her 
for major supplies like electricity.  
 
4.3 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
4.3.1 THE COLONIAL LEGACY 
The research reveals that one cannot adequately explain the problems of Africa in 
general and those of Zimbabwe specifically without referring to the legacy of 
colonialism that today defines Zimbabwean political economic and can be correctly 
be directly linked to the politico-economic malaise that defines the country today. The 
uneven development along racial lines which has been the norm in Zimbabwe for a 
great many years still has its casualties in the majority of the black people in the 
country who even today are still trying to find their feet in country that seems to have 
abandoned its own people in the midst of political crisis. As much as the policies of 
the colonial regime can be blamed and could not be rectified overnight the 
responsibility of delivering the Zimbabwean populace from the scourge of poverty 
and economic decay has been and will always be the responsibility of government. 
 
In 1980 when the “black” majority took over after years of a bloody liberation 
struggle, hope and the potential for wealth production and sharing among the 
previously disadvantaged was to be the order of the day-at least as promised by the 
incumbents. This was not to be as the country’s economy stagnated in the early 1990s 
and only to plunge even further into the twenty first century, which has been dubbed 
as the African century. Mayal (2005:37) affirms that after the end of the Cold War a 
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few leaders such as Mugabe did not cease to blame their colonizers for their troubles 
even though it was virtually ten years of majority rule. 
 
4.3.2 CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 
If one of the underpinning characteristics of democracy is good governance then   
Zimbabwe has become a bad example of democracy as the research reveals that the 
country has been characterised by bad governance more especially at the time when 
the ruling party was threatened by the establishment of the MDC. As evidenced by the 
responses from the interview process, mal-administration and the undermining of the 
rule of law became a norm in the country as the “division of power line” became 
blurred and was justified by the threats to judiciary and the audacity by the 
government to publicly defy judgments made in courts of law.  
 
One of the most undemocratic tactics employed by the ZANU-PF government at the time 
of dissatisfaction by a considerable fraction of the population was the control of the press. 
This became apparent and fear-rousing when independent newspapers were harassed and 
journalists were chastised, detained or deported in the case of foreign journalists.  
 
 When, in 1998, Mugabe sent some 11000 troops to the Congo and as people in the circle 
of his close acquaintances became rich from the diamonds from the Congo, the war 
veterans complained that they had not been compensated for brining freedom to 
Zimbabwe. Mugabe was forced to compensate them thus straining an already strained 
economy even further. 
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Furthermore, the country went into further crisis when squatters took over hundreds of 
white owned farms only to watch them become derelict. Due to the lack of coordination in 
the land redistribution programme, white farmers were forced out of their farms and these 
were thereafter occupied by ZANU-PF party members, war veterans and other squatters.  
 
4.3.3 THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND THE LAND 
QUESTION 
Similar to the legacy of colonialism, the land problem has always been a cause of 
disagreement in many African countries where indigenous people had been dispossessed 
of their land. In Africa land has a very significant meaning as he who owns most land is 
also revered in society and held in high esteem as they would be regarded as rich. This 
means land is synonymous with economic prowess. Literature documents considerable 
evidence of how the land question brought about political unrest in Zimbabwe.  
In trying to bring about peace in Zimbabwe, the British assisted in setting up the 
Zimbabwe conference on reconstruction and development in 1981.At that conference, 
more than £630 million of aid was pledged and a considerable sum of this was to 
assist with the redistribution of land. The first phase of land reform in the 1980, which 
was partially funded by the United Kingdom, successfully resettled around 70,000 
landless people on more than 20,000 km² of land (Wikipedia, 2006).  
The research reveals that the British did not keep their promise and as a result the 
redistribution process became frustrated and slow. It is this growing frustration that 
led to political unrest as people had waited for far too long for a promise that was 
made some years ago to be fulfilled. This was to be expected.  
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As much as the land redistribution process began in the early 1980s, it was very slow 
for the majority of the people who had waited for decades to have their land back to 
them, as they were the rightful custodians. Legislation after legislation was passed to 
try to hasten the process but this also was met by resistance from the white farmers 
who felt threatened that they now had to give up some of their land for the 
resettlement of black Zimbabweans. 
However, as much as this land redistribution process was meant to mainly benefit the 
poor, research reveals that the process was marred with corruption as some of the 
farms were given to government officials and their friends at the expense of the 
indignant majority.  
The worst came when, out of desperation, the government condoned the coercive seizure 
of land by war veterans who occupied formerly white owned farms without any plans to 
revive the farms and increase production. This obviously had a negative impact on the 
economy and the already delicate political landscape as the economy depends so much on 
agricultural production. The responses from the respondents were unanimous in as far as 
agreeing that it was due to this ‘revolution’ that the economy of Zimbabwe took a hard 
knock that led to stagflation at first and later to total collapse of the economy.  
 
4.3.4 THE CRISIS OF ELITES 
It is evident that the organic crisis or the crisis of elites as espoused by Gramsci earlier 
in this study was in more ways than the beginning of the worst for Zimbabwe. Albeit 
the research does not apparently suggest that the crisis of the ruling class was the 
beginning of the political crisis in Zimbabwe, it does suggest however that the 
greatest political crisis began in the late 1990s into the early 2000s when the elites 
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tried by all means possible to regain their support which seemed to be dwindling by 
the day.  Left unchecked this support would be susceptible to exploitation by the 
opposition, which was a broad church that accommodated all ideologies and people 
from all walks of life. The elite crisis was further exacerbated by the belief at least by 
Mugabe and his counterparts in the ruling party that the MDC “and its base may not 
allow the Mugabe the compromises facilitating many other African president’s 
departures” (Moore, 2006:121). 
 
This is manifested by the selective distribution of government services and other food 
relief paraphernalia. Again the compensation of war veterans with billions of dollars 
as well as the hastening of the land redistribution programme which became a major 
contributing factor to the economic collapse in the country was seen as a desperate 
measure by the elites in the ruling party to regain the support of the hoi polloi. The 
internal conflict within the ruling party is interpreted as the crisis among elites who 
had for some time seen eye to eye when there were fewer problems to solve in the 
midst of political and economic bliss.  
 
4.3.5 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES 
When the neo-liberal SAP was introduced in Zimbabwe it was meant to revive and almost 
ailing economy that could easily compete comfortably in the global metropolitan economy 
and ultimately bring about wealth and constant economic growth. At its embryonic stages, 
the SAP did promise to become a panacea to the economic problems of the country as well 
as a beacon of hope for the poor. As the SAP was ‘authored’ and funded by the IMF and 
the World Bank, as one would expect, the state had to play a minimal role in the economy 
and reduce on social spending. 
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This did not work in a country that was only eleven years into democracy and still had a 
considerable number of people dependent on government grants and affordable or cheap 
state subsidized social services e.g. health services, education, etc. the economic frustration 
actually began when the SAP could not meet its targets which were to: 
• achieve GDP growth of 5% during 1991-95; 
• raise savings to 25% of GDP; 
• raise investment to 25% of GDP; 
• achieve export growth of 9% per annum; 
• reduce the budget deficit from over 10% of GDP to 5% by 1995; 
• reduce inflation from 17.7% to 10% by 1995 (Kanyenze, 2003:56). 
 
 4.3.6 CORRUPTION AND FRAUD 
Corruption and fraud have come out as the top most reasons why some of the African 
countries today are referred to as failed states or are on the brink of collapse like in 
the case of the Congo during Mobutu’s time. Documentary evidence suggests that the 
country has been riddled with corrupt individuals who either purported clietilism or 
used their status as government officials to get prebends and enrich themselves. This 
reciprocal assimilation of elites and the sustenance of the patron-client relationship 
could no longer continue in the face of a vibrant civil society (represented by various 
civic organisations of non-governmental organisations) and vocal opposition in the 
form of the MDC. 
 
The corruption that took place in state owned enterprises led to riots that further 
fuelled the political and economic as the resentment of the state and those upon whom 
the custodianship of the state purse had been bestowed. Furthermore, the deployment 
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of   about 11000 troops to the Congo left much to be desired in terms of financial 
stability.  
 
4.3.7 SOUTH AFRICA’S “QUIET DIPLOMACY”  
 As a regional power in the SADC, South Africa lost the opportunity of acting 
decisively to avert a political crisis in Zimbabwe when it was still at its early stages. 
The quiet diplomacy that South Africa was using to bring about stability in the 
country seemed ineffective as, in its midst, Mugabe continued to execute his plans 
that rapidly brought down the Zimbabwean economy.  
 
The fact that the crisis in Zimbabwe affected the economic situation in South Africa 
was cause for concern and action to turnaround the situation in Zimbabwe. The influx 
of Zimbabwean refugees into South Africa was also another reason why South Africa 
had to intervene in the country so as stabilise the political situation. The camaraderie 
that binds the two liberation movements (ZANU-PF and the African National 
Congress) is apparently one of the reasons South Africa defended Zimbabwe against 
international scorn. If South Africa had strategically used the carrot and stick 
approach, one is tempted to draw the conclusion that the Zimbabwean political 
situation would have yielded a positive result.  
 
4.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
The chapter presented a discussion and analysis of the major causes of the political 
crisis in Zimbabwe as well as how the different events that took place between 1995 
and 2005 gave shape to the current political environment. Analysis and interpretation 
of primary and secondary sources has been done to explain exactly how the state 
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deteriorated from being a self-sustaining economy to an economy on the brink of 
collapse. These causes range from the legacy of colonialism which is an Africa wide 
phenomenon to the Zimbabwe specific causes that elucidate the theory of the organic 
crisis as well as the theory of state failure. Other causes are also not unique to 
Zimbabwe but show a gloomy picture of the situation in a country that used to enjoy 
reverence as a well-functioning democracy for many years. The analysis shows that 
the failure the SAP that was introduced in the early 1990s is among the major reasons 
why Zimbabwe failed her people’s economic aspirations that would later lead to a 
dangerous political crisis. At the regional level South Africa seems to have 
contributed to the problem by not rendering much needed support to turn Zimbabwe 
around both political and economically. As a rider to that, the interpretation of the 
evidence gathered, shows that the economic decay led to the frustration of those in 
power as well as the establishment of a vibrant opposition party the MDC. The 
thematic analysis has been used to make a more detailed and systematic interpretative 
analysis.   
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Motivated by the spirit of development and politico-economic prowess on the African 
continent, the researcher embarked on this study in order to make an enquiry as to 
how did Zimbabwe that used is said to have been the breadbasket of Sub-Saharan 
Africa find itself in an unprecedented crisis in the hands of a legitimate and 
democratic regime. Since much work has already been done, this chapter presents the 
summary of the study, conclusions, implications and recommendations of this study 
and further makes recommendations for further study. If this study makes reference to 
other countries in Africa and elsewhere in the world then the recommendations that 
this study makes could be of great significance to the African federations of states at 
regional and continental level. 
 
5.2. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
This study has from the very onset and conceptualisation sought to give evidence that 
the Zimbabwean political crisis has been as a result of the crisis in the elites or 
leadership as suggested by the theory of organic crisis as promulgated by Antonio 
Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks. The study further got guidance from the theory of 
state collapse. These theories have, as discussed in chapter two and four, have shed 
light on African political economy in general and Zimbabwe specifically.  
 
Chapter two of the study presented the literature review and has brought about much 
needed evidence from Africa and abroad as far as the Zimbabwean political crisis is 
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concerned. The chapter has also discussed some theoretical works in detail so as to 
build a case for the assumptions made by the researcher earlier in the study. 
Comprehensive research was embarked upon and the researcher, having applied his 
mind to the literature read, made  inference that the Zimbabwean crisis was indeed  as 
a result of the political meltdown in the ruling elites who in this case were mainly 
members of the ruling ZANU-PF led by its longstanding president Robert Mugabe.   
 
Chapter three presented the methodology that has been used to go about is research in 
trying to get answers where none could be found in secondary sources. Qualitative 
research methods were used to collect data. Interviews were the main primary source 
of data collection that was used. With interviews done, the researcher summarised the 
respondents’ responses so as to build one view where respondents have agreed 
unanimously on one issue. The thematic analysis has been used as the method of 
analysis as seen in chapter four. 
 
The fourth chapter makes the analysis of the evidence gathered and further makes the 
necessary conclusions as illuminated by the information gathered both from primary 
and secondary sources. The analysis is divided in themes to make the study easier for 
anyone to read. One will notice that the themes have been derived from literature 
read, documents, primary sources as well as the researchers’ earlier assumptions e.g. 
the crisis of elites though the theory, as espoused by Gramsci,  speaks to that. 
 
5.3. CONCLUSIONS WITH REGARD TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 
Since this study was to answer a set question with the aid of different tools of 
research, the researcher believes that such questions have already been answered in a 
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satisfactory manner. Since these are discussed in detail in chapter four and as 
concluded with the aid of primary information from the respondents, hereunder is a 
brief summary of the findings:  
 
5.3.1 What have been the primary reasons for the political crisis in Zimbabwe 
between 1995 and 2005? 
The Zimbabwean crisis seems to have been as a result of political reasons such as the 
failure of political leadership as well as failure of SAPS.  
 
5.3.2 What role has the political elite played in the country’s development? 
The ruling elites who have enjoyed tremendous support since independence fell out of 
favour of a significant part of the electorate as they reneged almost since 1980 from 
the promises of better socio-economic well being.  
 
5.3.3 What contribution did the Structural Adjustment Programme make to the 
economic development of Zimbabwe? 
When the SAP resulted to even further economic decline, the political landscape 
changed as people became concerned about their dwindling livelihoods. 
 
5.3.4 Are there any other important factors that have played a role in the 
development process of Zimbabwe? 
African countries that could bring about change in Zimbabwe did not do as expected 
and instead looked on from afar e.g. South Africa was expected to help bring stability 
to the country that its instability relatively meant instability at her own shores. 
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In short, the African continent has for centuries been the pariah continent of the world 
riddled with disease, famine, wars, ethnic conflicts and a crisis of government. 
Zimbabwe is one of those African countries that have had a good start after the end of 
colonialism and a few decades down the line plunged themselves into crisis. Some of 
these countries are the democratic Republic of Congo, countries in the horn of Africa 
and Somalia which is a typical example of a collapsed state. Zimbabwe has as a result 
of the crisis of the elites or the crisis of authority found itself in the midst of misery to 
such an extent that she has been referred to as a state on the brink of collapse. 
Actually this research also makes that conclusion.  
 
It is apparent that when a state does not make effort to combat destructive practices 
like corruption, clientilism, nepotism and fraud, which are some of the ingredients for 
state collapse, it is easy for the state to find itself having to deal with a crisis that 
would have otherwise been averted. When the ruling party took note of their 
evaporating support which could dangerously lead to the changing of the guard, the 
ruling party employed undesirable measures to quash the opposition and regain 
popular support. These measures included harassment of the opposition, censorship, 
undermining the rule of law as well ass selectively re-distributing assets such as land.  
 
As much as the MDC seemed to be a force to be reckoned with in the politics of 
Zimbabwe it is evident its nature or design became its own enemy. The fact that this 
party was a broad church only united by the desire to get rid of the ZANU/PF 
government was by and large its Achilles tendon. Since the party had no single 
ideological inclination it found itself in a huge quagmire even before it had fulfilled 
its mission. Due to this predicament the ruling party still could not be defeated at the 
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polls albeit some election analysts have attributed the party’s victory to vote rigging 
and intimidation. 
It is without doubt that the people of Zimbabwe were discontented with the slowness 
of service delivery including the lack of economic growth that resulted to the rise in 
unemployment figures and the number of destitute people. As much as this was as a 
result of the failed SAP that was advocated by the IMF and the World Bank, the 
Zimbabweans put the blame on the government of the day. These developments 
changed the political landscape in Zimbabwe considerably.   
 
 
5.4. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
Given the political significance of this study, the researcher saw it appropriate that he 
mentions the implications of this study for the Southern African region as well as the 
continent in its entirety. The implications hereunder have been derived from the 
information gathered earlier in the previous chapters particularly from interviews. 
These are:  
5.4.1 Federal Organisations 
 If the situation in Zimbabwe is not solved within the bounds of the legal framework 
as provided by the Zimbabwean constitution and the prescripts of the AU or the 
SADC, then Africa will be seized with similar problems in future. These institutions 
will not be worth the monies and energy exhausted in their creation. African state 
federations like the SADC and the AU need to ‘have teeth’ and act decisively as their 
inconsistency on problem solving could lead to their incessant weakness and ultimate 
decay.  
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5.4.2 Leadership change 
 Since it is apparent that the notion of presidents for life is not working for the African 
continent, how better then for African countries to make constitutional reforms that 
would avert this phenomenon. If the crisis of leadership has brought Zimbabwe to an 
impasse, does this not mean in could also bring another country to the same level of 
negative development? If the answer is yes then African countries need to act with the 
utmost caution when it comes to issues of succession, more especially in countries 
with a long history of liberation movements like South Africa which seems to be 
riddled with a leadership succession crisis.  
 
5.4.3 Economic reforms 
 The Zimbabwean crisis is evidence that when the politics is not right, it is highly 
possible that the socio-economics of a country can be adversely affected. Is it not high 
time that Africa designed her own economic development models? The answer to this 
question is yes. If the Western models for economic development do not work in 
Africa then the Africans themselves should invests heavily on alternative models for 
the sake of their own future economic development.  
 
5.5. AREA FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Since the causes of state collapse in Africa and other regions of the world have been 
researched on, albeit not adequately, it would be appropriate for scholars to consider 
doing more research on how this phenomenon can be prevented before it creates 
instability and havoc more especially in Africa. With specific reference to Zimbabwe 
one would expect more research to be done in trying to find a lasting solution to the 
political and socio-economic ills of the country as these have the potential of 
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snowballing into other countries in the region e.g. the land crisis could spill over to 
South Africa which also seems to have similar problems around land redistribution.   
 
5.6. CONCLUSION 
This research has demonstrated that the Zimbabwean crisis is a result of the crisis of 
leadership and has exposed other contributing factors such as corruption, the ESAPs, 
the colonial legacy, etc. The study also concludes that the political and economic 
crisis could have been averted long before it reached catastrophic levels had the 
leaders been willing to make compromises and focus on the future the country as a 
whole much earlier. It has now become clear that if Zimbabwe is to join the rest of the 
world in weaving the global economic tapestry (globalisation) and be a great player in 
world affairs today, then there is a need  to right a lot many wrongs that relegate them  
to the fringes of the global village. If Zimbabwe is a player in the democratic or 
democratization arena then she should play by the rules and not invent new ones or 
defy existing ones. And if Zimbabwe is following another form of governance then 
she should not pretend to be a player in the field of the democracy game as she will be 
penalised as having broken the rules of this game. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the 
gains made by the formation of the Government of National Unity with ZANU-PF 
and two MDC factions sharing power. We hope that this positive step will take 
Zimbabwe forward and offer Zimbabweans a better future.  
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